

Intell

was question ever asked:

What are all our assets for info
on SVN?

How many "experts"? — who
when in gov
agents? qualifications

SI

recon

analysts

VN-speakers

academics: consultants
experts

newsmen
state reporters, analysts

Is there a basis for comparing knowledge and info on
one country vs. another?

Research on Intell

1. Shadow-pricing system for intell
2. Program budget for intell
Cost data (e.g. "cost-price" of an N/E
[That would motivate score-keeping].
3. Value of info:
conceptual analysis; study of past impact...
4. Have to focus on intell requirements
(and educate intell analysts
on decision problems?)
5. (Compare Witten on ^{value of} Meteorological Info)
6. Compare VCS to USIB in (a) style of communication
("authoritative pronouncements")
("40's/50's style" still for USIB?)
[Note lack of ^{can} ~~the~~ ^{between} Congress + VCS: so that
Pres. can't appear to ignore "military judgment."]
7. Interviews of high (past) users: ^{assumptions of Intell Com} rather limits on credibility, ^{influence}
8. Analysis of past estimates: accuracy, clarity, timeliness,
relevance, responsiveness, apparent impact.

look at surprises; Who was right?
look at intell controversies; conflicts between intell and
Then, outside beliefs

Intell

1. Decision/org model: supply model of relevant reality for decision-making: what will happen if...

Transfer this from head of analyst to D.

2. How credible is transfer?

2. Ch: opinions, info, types, as data, evidence, for D.

(a) How accurately does D perceive A's 'output', 'views'.

(b) How influential is it? What relative impact

How influential should it be? For national interest?

Compare relative record.

has been

3. On VN, divergence of O from A is so great

that one must question the transfer as goal of process.

What is the function of an NIE?

Of other intell acts?

4. Still, this is — or should be — any function of an NIE.

Clearly, a "communication failure"

and/or a "credibility gap"

(perhaps also an "attention gap")

and competing 'evidence': e.g. "common sense,"

operational estimates.

wishes, theories

5. - Am-blyth relations (e.g. security)

- lack of mutual expenire (compan militay: (SA)
- lack of liaison (compan militay)
- Committee org. of intell [like JCS]

"Protect authority" by smitly reasoning, ^{evidence}
(on which, disajunt, doubt by ready)

- hiding disajunt

- fighting record-keeping

- addressing uncertainty: ^{ground, and} differential

- "compromises" - to get united front

- ~~hedge~~ - lack of face-to-face, or staff, interaction

- words-of-art not definal

- Denie to hedge, protect rep

coziness

qualifications

avoid post-mortems...

- Best problem (see 18)

6. Inadequate communs., + handling of:

- Uncertainty; adajunary of info, experthar

- controurary

- means and prospects and costs of ~~hedge~~ing

reducing uncertainty and controurary

- SA or SN/E-type analysis, esp. ^{(a) political, (b) involving US} stages

Belt: get away from intell analysts talking to intell analysts

7. Perceptions of D on these matters:

- does A know what they are?
- does A do anything about it?
- is there a dialog?

[What is D response to a bad, naïve, est.?
to a wrong est.?

8. Fear of dialog — intell getting into

Blocks to dialog

Value of info

Explicitness of model

Dialog

9. Leading to improvement (a) presentation (— more relevant, explicit
— better understanding of "
— better evaluation of other

(b) collection, analysis,

resolution of uncertainty.

Could cut down "regrets" by expressing
uncertainty — e.g. "as one knows — now frankly,
convincingly,

Who is in intell comm?

(Not SAC, Service, MACV Intell?) JCS
("Wash level intell...") J-2
SA

- Who is perceived by D as in intell?
- Whose mistakes diminish credibility of "intell"?
- Whose arguments create impression of "intell controversy"?
- Who forms a community? — mutual ams,


With what info^{parts} is "intell" produced by "Intell Comm"?

— e.g., USIB — computing? Relative report?

(Exp: esp., output of SAC Intell, J-2; Service Intell
MACV ops, SA, ISA....)

- Limitations of cables and estimates in educating new decision-makers?

- Interviews : e.g. out-of-office ^{user + intell} official (Clifford, Latham)

- Analysis of past estimates : language, content, "score"
 McN... Komer

- Formulate other types on blocks to credibility, communications
-- look at committee intell

- Models of intell process and function:


value of info

value experiments

statistical inference and practice of statisticians

- Study apparent relevance and impact on decision of
past intell outputs.

Compare "Mc pattern" to intell



Decision Game

17 July 69

- Focus on decision process (LSC - "educational technique")
Note "reaction" of past games w.r.t. process.
- Test hypotheses from:
 - Lessons from VN
 - MCN studies
 - Other crisis studies (Allison) (WSEG?)
Kao, Berlin,
 - Org theory
 - Past game records
- Compare "blind" play to "modified, critiqued" play:
Then, expand critique session:
ask Why?
What were you thinking, etc.
Then, play again: or play on
might replicate
- Structure: High-level authority; staff; intell; "field"; control
(Enemy?) [Opposing bureaus? Competing staffs?]
- Relate to intell game: same? Value of info.
- Aim at test of hyps; new hyps; experiment; ultimately,
"teach" real authorities, change process.

Simple hyps:

(a) RP₁ (forces staff produces only one option)

Best Miserable Choice: May Work

(no costs, probs, impact of failure, what then)

(b) No checking of info, e.g. from field.

(c) Inadequate alternatives: no complaint from NCA's.

(d) Divergent views of NCA, staff, intell: effects.

[Why don't NCA's critique past "exercises";
or strategy

[Is objective to clarify aims, alternatives, etc. in
given ^{substantive} area?

Or — to improve decision process, in general?

Or — to investigate it...

Only Theory ^{hyps:} (a) not based on National Security data
(b) Not tested



8

Konrad:

Konrad focus on crisis management

Why crisis? Because not anticipated.

Why not? Bad forward planning: can't be addressed in a game. Foreign policy people can't manage programs

One can foresee (in past) blowups of Cyprus, Arab-Israeli

}

Shulint: That high people to construct a game, not to play it.

LLLLL


Weiner
Santoluc } org behavior

AVW - Marshall: build bureaucratic conflict into
the game. Have parties estimate each other's
positions.

Ask for 0

Have a "staff" for each of several principals;
have the fight for "their" proposal

[Treat NSSM-1 as a game?



AVW: How can make known shortcomings
vivid to decision-makers, so as to

- (A) change the personal styles
- or (B) win the support to institutional changes in
decision system

Intelligence

Rex Brown: RH Ann Arbor, Bayesian Conf
June '69

1. Tendency of decision theory/OR groups ~ industry:
Note "the problems they solve are not the problems
management has"

partly (a) incentives of staff are for intellectually
sound & definitive solutions, not to produce
relevant, implementable results.

(b) time analyses take (problems have changed).

2. Experiments have shown that actual results are
outside the "99% confidence interval" about
40% of the time. I.e. if you are "certain"
outcome will lie between X and Y : take these
roughly as quartiles rather than 99% limits.
(better: quintiles).

3. In some companies, decision theory (decision tree)

e.g. Pillsbury

4. A prediction (on which a decision is based) becomes a target: a base for judging management.

An "expected" value by operator is a target he feels sure he can beat.

He is very reluctant to see a "median" expectation be recorded as expectation: if he is 50% likely to fall below that, he foresees, ^{.5 prob. of} being consigned.

5. Companies never take non-linear utility formally into account.

6. Companies prefer elaborate deterministic model using certainty-equivalents, than a simple model presenting uncertainty explicitly; they believe advantage of complexity outweighs cost of pretending certainty (and they can Monte Carlo deterministic model on computer).

[DE issues:

[VN]

1. Effect of operators' bias: and what companies do about it.

Brown: GE requires plant requests to be accompanied by prob. dist.

So companies do ask themselves what prob. dist. will "scraper by", and what inputs are required.

Checks:

- (1) Negative incentives for bad estimates, ^{retrospectively}
[at least: could compare predictions, s.g. by Intell and Operators.]

- (2) Top management can make estimates of bias

[Congress, on OOD requests: but OOD can foresee this & adapt.

- Body count.]

DE

1. VN. operators' ests and reporting
vs. Intell (or "objective ests")

How?

2. Is data used to change estimates?

Brown: Almost no example of prior/
posterior analysis. (

But there are examples of pre-posterior
analysis, - deciding whether to undertake research or
experiment.

Perhaps: (a) Operator has strong intuition after
new info comes in; is willing to reject implications
of prior and likelihood function.

(b) but has little intuition about the
value of information.

3. Why is stall est. ignored?

4. Note upon demand for "evidence."

Jack Zlotnick, CIA: (going to ANSER)

[1. How about using OT esp. - case of intell.
controversy: likelihood frs., etc.; probes; hyps;

[2. Examine track record.

[3. Examine failures, surprises: Missile/bomber gaps,
Cuba II, IRBM, Upisings,

[Consider McCone vs. analysts in Cuba II.]

Analysts are able to make quick judgments in
Bayesian form.

- Problem: Effect of uncertainty of information on
the use of likelihood-ratios vs. absolute
probs.

- Problem of updating likelihood ratios over time
(consider non-stationarity of process).

"We get moving odds; if they shift, suspect non-stationarity."

[How about game-uncertainties: uncertainties of info
based on contrary will generating info.]

Has DT affected expression/presentation of
judgments?

DVI Intel Mus

- \$ - A Math Model for Intel Warning
(Chen) Nov '67
- \$ - Bayes' Theorem - the Korean War
mid-1968

Proctor